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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3110 
 ___________ 
 
 SAMUEL ACEVEDO MUNIZ, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 DONNA ZICKEFOOSE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-02444) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                         February 1, 2012 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, FISHER and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: February 3, 2012) 
 
  
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Samuel Muniz, a federal prisoner incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix, appeals an order 
denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition.  We will affirm. 
 Muniz filed his petition in May 2010, accusing the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) of 
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erring in its calculation of his term of incarceration.  However, upon reviewing the 
sentence prior to filing its reply, the BOP determined that Muniz was entitled to the 
requested adjustment.  It therefore revised Muniz’s term of incarceration to provide credit 
for the time he had spent in state custody from June 9, 1999, through July 10, 2001, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3.  As Muniz “ha[d] received the relief he seeks and the 
Petition no longer present[ed] a live case or controversy,” the Government asked for the 
District Court to dismiss the petition as moot, and the District Court obliged.  
 Shortly thereafter, Muniz submitted a document entitled “Petitioner’s Informative 
Motion and Request for Determination,” in which, inter alia, he further challenged his 
revised term of incarceration because “the BOP failed to credit good conduct time from 
June 9, 1999.”  Determining that this ground should have been raised in a new petition, 
the District Court simultaneously opened a new docket1 and denied the new petition 
without prejudice as unexhausted.  See Muniz v. Zickefoose, No. 10–2444, 2011 WL 
3022439, at *4–5 (D.N.J. July 21, 2011).  A timely notice of appeal followed.2
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291
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1 D.N.J. Civ. No. 1:11-cv-04200. 
 
2 Muniz also moved to reconsider and reopen after he filed his notice of appeal.  The 
District Court’s eventual denial of those motions is not before us, as Muniz failed to “file 
a notice of appeal, or an amended notice of appeal . . . within the time prescribed by” the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); United States v. 
McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 668 (3d Cir. 2000).  
 
3 Muniz elected to stand on his petition, rendering the dismissal without prejudice 
appealable.  Lucas v. Twp. of Bethel, 319 F.3d 595, 600 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 and 2253.  Our review of the 
District Court’s legal conclusions is plenary.  See Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 262 (3d 
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Cir. 2000).  “A challenge to the BOP’s execution of a sentence is properly brought under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241.”  Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 First, we agree with the District Court that Muniz’s post-dismissal filing was 
properly construed as a new petition.  The claims raised were altogether new—indeed, 
they arose from Muniz’s success in achieving relief under his first petition.  The District 
Court appropriately determined that “what [Muniz] filed as the Motion in this action 
should have been filed—after due administrative exhaustion—as a new and separate 
§ 2241 petition.”  Muniz, 2011 WL 3022439, at *4.   
Federal prisoners are ordinarily required to exhaust available administrative 
remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.  Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 
757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349, 358 & n.16 (1st 
Cir. 1999); Little v. Hopkins, 638 F.2d 953, 953–54 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).  In 
order to exhaust, petitioners must satisfy the procedural requirements of the 
administrative remedy process.4  Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761–62.  Muniz argues that he did 
exhaust by lodging the complaints that gave rise to his initial § 2241 petition, but we do 
not agree; as the specific sentence-calculation issue, involving good-conduct-time credits, 
arose only after the filing of the first petition, the BOP could not have been on notice of 
the problem and was therefore unable to apply its expertise to it.  See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 
761–62 (explaining why exhaustion is required under § 2241).  Nor has Muniz shown 
that exhaustion would be futile and hence excused.  See Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 
156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Fazzini v. N.E. Ohio Corr. Ctr., 473 F.3d 229, 236 (6th 
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Cir. 2006) (“[A] habeas petitioner’s failure to complete the administrative remedy 
process may be excused where his failure is due to the administrator, rather than the 
petitioner . . . .”).  That the Government’s counsel believes the law to require a contrary 
outcome does not excuse Muniz from pursuing the administrative remedies the BOP 
makes available, and Muniz has not otherwise demonstrated that the “purposes of 
exhaustion would not be served here.”  Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 
239 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Nor do we detect any error in the District Court’s procedural approach.  The 
Government properly raised the affirmative defense of exhaustion in opposition to 
Muniz’s “motion.”  Winck v. England, 327 F.3d 1296, 1304 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003).  And 
despite being given “thirty days” from dismissal to show exhaustion and reopen 
proceedings, see Muniz, 2011 WL 3022439, at *5, Muniz did not timely do so.  Cf. 
Landano v. Rafferty, 897 F.2d 661, 668 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[A] habeas petitioner bears the 
burden of proving that he has exhausted available . . . remedies.”). 
In sum, we agree with the District Court’s decision to dismiss the case without 
prejudice, and we will affirm its judgment.  Should Muniz eventually exhaust the 
available administrative remedies—and his submissions to this Court suggest that his 
efforts to exhaust may still be ongoing—he may file a new petition at that time in 
compliance with all applicable rules. 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.13–15; Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1204 (10th Cir. 2010). 
